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LEGAL MEMORANDA

EDITOR'S NOTE
"Legal Memoranda" is a regularsection of the Review devoted to reports from correspondinglaw firms throughout the hemisphere. The reports are compiled by the Review, but their accuracy is represented by the corresponding law firms, to which all
inquiries should be directed.
We appreciate the contributions of our corresponding law
firms and invite other law firms interested in participating in
this section to contact us.

ARGENTINA
The following is a brief summary of recent legislative
developments in Argentina
ARGENTINA: NEW MEASURE TO DEFEAT THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December of last
year had repercussions on and notably worsened the emerging
markets' economies, demanding accelerated solutions to avoid
falling behind Mexico.
Argentina began to resist the inevitable, suffering of a slow
but steady drain of liquidity from its monetary system. Furthermore, there was strong pressure for exchange rate adjustments,
which would have meant the abandonement of the
"Convertibility" Rule (The "Convertibility" Rule establishes that
the Central Bank must always stand ready to provide U.S. dollars for peso currency surrendered at the rate of 1:1, until the
monetary base of reserves and bonds is exhausted. At that point
in time, under the same law, the Central Bank is forbidden from
providing any additional credit). The tighter monetary condi-
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tions, imposed by the Mexican crisis and the fiscal policy compelled by the Convertibility Rule, moved the Argentine government to put a battery of new measures into effect. That is to
say, a new try to re-obtain a fiscal surplus in the absence of nonbank domestic or external financing and because of scarce domestic credit from a banking system shrunken by the capital
flight during the first quarter.
In order to add liquidity to the banks, which have been
losing disproportionately large shares of deposits, and to generate credit and guarantee the banking system's deposits, the
Argentine government recently amended the Central Bank's
charter and created a Fiduciary Fund for private bank capitalization.
In addition, the Argentine government, assisted and encouraged by the most representative economic groups, banks and
business institutions, launched the so-called Bono Argentina.
The Bond was issued to raise money for the creation of the
above mentioned Fiduciary Fund.
What follows is a summary of the above mentioned changes.
Amendments to the Central Bank's Charter
The existing official guaranty for banks' deposits, administered by the Central Bank, was increased to cover up to $5,000
(pesos or U.S. dollars, indistinctly) per person. Through this
guaranty, depositors will have the exclusive right to be repaid
out of the so-called Encajes. Encajes are mandatory reserves
that each institution is required to keep tied up at the Central
Bank.
In addition to the official guaranty, a private guaranty will
be created. Once in place, it will be onerous, mandatory and exclusive for deposits higher than $5,000 up to a maximum to be
determined (which is expected to be of $30,000 pesos or U.S.
dollars, indistinctly). In principle, the private guaranty will be
formed by funds contributed by all the private banks of the
system.
Suspension terms for troubled financial entities are extended from sixty to ninety days. Once this term elapses, the authorization to operate could be revoked if the troubled bank is not
in a position to do so normally.
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The new charter authorizes the Central Bank to obtain
loans from entities such as the International Bank of Basle, the
U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the Bundesbank,
the IMF or the World Bank. However, the Central Bank will not
be able in any case to affect the country's reserves backing the
monetary base.
In addition, it authorizes the Central Bank to provide extraordinary financing to troubled entities, receiving as collateral
its assets and its shareholders' equity.
The Central Bank will be able to sell, transfer or assign to
other institutions credits acquired from troubled banks. The
entity absorbing those assets would be taking control over the
troubled entity.
Should the Central Bank be obliged to close a bank, two
alternatives for protecting deposit-holders haven been established. One sets forth the mandatory reduction or increase, as
the case may be, of the troubled bank's capital and reserves in
order to absorb losses, or to fulfill minimum capital requirements. The other alternative foresees the exclusion and transfer
of the troubled bank's assets to other banks. The funds received
in such manner will be used by the troubled bank to cover its
deposits.
Shareholders of financial entitites could be penalized for
concealing their bank's connections with foreign entities in
which they hold controlling stakes, if they use them to carry out
off shore operations from Argentina.
Fiduciary Fundfor Private Banks' Capitalization
The Fund's objective is to capitalize and finance the mergers
and acquisition process of private banks which are not strategically positioned to compete within the system, are undercapitalized or have severe liquidity and structural problems.
The Fund will carry out the capitalization of the private
banking system through: (i) the subscription and integration of
capital contributions or convertible bonds; (ii) the purchase and
sale of bank's share; or (iii) the acquisition, sale and transfer of
banks' assets and liabilities.
The Fund's resources amount approximately to U.S. $2.5
billion, gathered through Bono Argentina. Other resources, such
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as funds provided by international multilateral institutions and
operation revenues, would be available to the Fund.
The Fiduciary Fund will be managed by an Executive Committee formed by five members representing the Ministry of
Economy, the Central Bank, and the local and foreign major
subscribers to the Bono Argentina. The Executive Committee
will be in charge of developing a plan or mechanism for selling
the acquired assets and establishing the applicable regulations
and time tables to be executed in each case.
The shares or interest acquired or received by the Fund will
be sold through public auctions and public or private tender
offers within the capital markets. Property and other assets will
be publicly or privately auctioned. Fiduciary funds will be deposited at qualified institutions approved by the Central Bank for
the custody of international reserves.
The Fiduciary Fund is expected to fulfill its object within a
period of two years. At that time, the Central Bank will consider, if necessary, the replacement of the Fund by an institution
with similar objectives. Such institution would also be in charge
of managing the above-mentioned guaranty of the deposits' system.
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